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INHO KIM*

"Milking" Oil Tankers: The
Paradoxical Effect of the Oil Pollution
Act of 1990
In response to the Exxon Valdez incident, the Oil PollutionAct of
1990 was enacted as allegedly comprehensive oil pollution legislation. The Act enforces double-hull requirementsfor tank vessels in
U.S. waters, except designated lightering zones or deepwater
offshore oil ports, until 2015. The requirements are efficient in
preventing oil spills but suffer from cost ineffectiveness because of
the large expenditures associated with them. In response to the
increase in capital and operating costs, the shipping industry has
changed its operation patterns to take advantage of cost-efficient
older single-hull tankers in U.S. waters. In particular,the retirement deadlines of single-hull vessels under the Act have had the
paradoxical effect of encouraging tanker owners to "milk" their
vessels up to the end of their legal economic lives. The Act has led
to an unexpected and undesirable situation in controlling oil
pollution risks, which calls for taking appropriate measures to
ensure the adequate operationof the older single-hull vessels.
I. INTRODUCTION
In response to the Exxon Valdez oil spill,1 the Oil Pollution Act of
19902 (OPA 90) was signed into law on August 18, 1990 as allegedly
comprehensive oil pollution legislation addressing the issues of oil
pollution cleanup, response, compensation, liability, and prevention.3 OPA
90 uses direct regulation as well as liability to control oil pollution risks
associated with marine oil transportation.' OPA 90 increases liability limits
for the shipping sector in the oil supply chain, rendering the liability of such

* Fulbright Scholar at the George Washington University Law School. Associate
Professor of Law, College of Law, Ewha Womans University. J.S.D., Stanford Law School.
1. On March 24, 1989, the Exxon Valdez ran aground on Bligh Reef in Prince William
Sound, Alaska, spilling approximately 240,500 barrels of crude oil into the Sound. The oil
covered approximately 1,100 miles of non-continuous coastline. See HAZARDOUS MATERIALS
RESPONSE & AssEsSMENT Dv., NATL OCEANIC & ATMOSPHERIC ADMIN., OIL SPILL CASE
HISTORIEs 1967-1991, at 80-86 (1992), available at http://response.restoration.noaa.gov/bookshelf/26_spilldb.pdf; ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., PETROLEUM: AN ENERGY PROFILE 1999, at 38(1999),
available at http://www.eia.doe.gov/pub/oil-gas/petroleum/analysis-publications/
petroleum.profile_1999/profile99v8.pdf.
2. See Oil Pollution Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-380, 104 Stat. 484 (codified as amended
in scattered sections of 33 U.S.C., 26 U.S.C., 46 U.S.C., 14 U.S.C.) [hereinafter OPA 1990].
3. Id.
4. Id.
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enterprises unlimited in most cases.5 OPA 90 also provides numerous
tanker safety and pollution prevention regulations, including the doublehull requirements for tank vessels.6 Under OPA 90, the shipping sector is
faced with the risk of unlimited liability and the certainty of increased
capital and operating costs.
By channeling substantially unlimited liability to the shipping sector,
and none to the cargo sector, OPA 90 motivated most major oil companies to
contract out the risky activity of oil shipping to independent operators. OPA
90 also undermined oil companies' incentives to charter safer but more
expensive tankers from the shipping sector. As a result, the policy of the oil
companies generated derivative disincentive in the shipping sector. The
shipping sector has not entirely withdrawn from U.S. waters, but rather
changed its operation patterns to take advantage of cost-efficient older singlehull vessels in those waters. In particular, the retirement deadlines of singlehull vessels under OPA 90 have created this paradoxical effect.
This article first reviews and analyzes the double-hull requirements
in OPA 90, followed by an examination of their cost effectiveness. This
article then examines the effect of the double-hull requirements and the
retirement deadlines of single-hull vessels under OPA 90.
II. DOUBLE-HULL REQUIREMENTS
A. Implementation
OPA 90 requires new tank vessels operating in U.S. waters to be
constructed with double hulls and the existing single-hull or double-bottom
or double-side vessels to be phased out under a timetable based on the tank
vessel's age and tonnage, beginning in 1995 and running through 2015 (see
Table 1). OPA 90 requires compliance from vessels engaged in oil trade in
U.S. waters irrespective of their country of registry. Single-hull vessels of at
least 5,000 gross tons are excluded from U.S. waters beyond 2010 (see
Appendix). Double-hull requirements do not apply to vessels operating at
low risk areas, deepwater ports, or designated offshore lightering 7 areas
until 2015. OPA 90 and its international counterpart MARPOL 73/78

5. Id.
6. Id.
7. Lightering is defined as the process of transferring petroleum cargo, excluding
bunkers, from the ship to be lightered to the service (or receiving) vessel for the purpose of
enabling tankers, large or with a deep draft, to enter the harbor or approach the terminal where
the cargo is to be delivered. See MARINE BD., COMM. ON OIL SPILL RISKS FROM TANK VESSEL
LIGHTERING & NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL, COMM'N. ON ENG'G &TECHNICALSYS., OILSPILL RISKS
FROM TANK VESSEL LIGHTERING 12-13 (1998).

8.

See Carriage of Liquid Bulk Dangerous Cargoes, 46 U.S.C. § 3703a (2006).

"MILKING" OIL TANKERS

Fall 20071

regulations 1/13G 9 limit the operating life of single-hull vessels by setting
a retirement date up to which the vessels are allowed to operate in U.S.
waters and in international waters respectively. However, it would be
possible that an oil tanker is allowed to trade in one of the waters, but not
in the other, because the phasing-out schedules differ (see Table 2).
Table 1: Requirements of OPA for New Vessels and Existing Vessels' °
NEW VESSELS

EXISTING VESSELS

Size

< 5,000 GT

k 5,000 GT

< 5,000 GT

> 5,000 GT

Hull
requirements

double-hull or
double-

double hull

double-hull or
double-

double hull

operational
measures

Per schedule

Nov. 27,

starting in 1995

1996

containment
systems'

containment
systems

Enforcement

• contracted after June 30,1990

after Jan. 1, 2015

date

. delivered after Jan. 1, 1994

a: No double-containment system has been approved by the Secretary of
Transportation.
Table 2: Phasing-out Schedule of MARPOL 13G for Existing Vessels"
Category
Size

Category I

Category 2

Category 3

(pre-MARPOL tankers)

(MARPOL tankers)

(small tankers)
crude carriers <

crude carriers a 20,000 DWT and product

5,000 DWT

carriers 2 30,000 DWT

20,000 DWT and 5,000 DWT :
product carriers < 30,000 DWT

Enforcem

April 5, 2005 for ships

ent date

delivered on April 5,1982
or earlier

April 5, 2005 for ships delivered on April 5, 1977 or earlier
2005 for ships delivered after April 5, 1977 but before Jan. 1, 1978
• 2006 for ships delivered in 1978 and 1979
* 2007 for ships delivered in 1980 and 1981
*

* 2008 for ships delivered in 1982
* 2009 for ships delivered in 1983
* 2010 for ships delivered in 1984 or later

9. See International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships, Nov. 2, 1973,
1340 U.N.T.S. 184, reprintedin 12 I.L.M. 1319, amended by Protocol, Feb. 17,1978,34 U.S.T. 3407,
1340 U.N.T.S. 61, reprintedin 17 I.L.M. 546 (regulation amended on Mar. 6, 1992) [hereinafter
MARPOLI.
10. See MARINE BD., COMM. ON OIL POLLUTION ACT OF 1990 (SECTION 4115)
IMPLEMENTATION REV. & NATL RESEARCH COUNCIL, COMM'N ON ENG'G & TECHNICAL SYS.,
DOUBLE-HULL TANKER LEGISLATION: AN ASSESSMENT OF THE OIL POLLUTION ACT OF 1990 (1998)
[hereinafter DOUBLE-HULL TANKER LEGISLATION: AN ASSESSMENT].
11. MARPOL, supra note 9, at 13(G)(4); see generally International Maritime Organization,
http://www.imo.org (follow "site index" hyperlink located at bottom of webpage, then follow
"MARPOL" hyperlink) (providing a detailed summary of the amendments).
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OPA 90 sets requirements for the interim structural and operational
measures for tank vessels of 5,000 gross tons or more without double hulls
until 2015.12 Charged with enforcing the statute, the U.S. Coast Guard
accordingly has implemented a three-phased scheme to reduce oil pollution
from existing single-hull tank vessels. As the first phase, the Coast Guard
published on August 5, 1994 a rule requiring the owners or operators of
tank vessels of 5,000 gross tons or more without double hulls to carry
emergency lightering equipment on board. 3 The principal benefit of this
regulation is to ensure rapid oil transfer from a stricken tank vessel to
another, minimizing the risk of further spillage. The regulation addresses
ex post spill actions rather than prevention or reduction of oil spills. As a
result of this final rule, early vessel retirements are not anticipated.14
The second phase was a final rule issued on July 30,1996 requiring
operational measures such as an under-keel clearance requirement,
maneuvering performance capability tests, and an enhanced survey
program.'" This rule focuses on reducing the risk of groundings, collisions,
or fires. 16 The minimum under-keel clearance is designed to reduce oil spills
as a result of groundings during transit to and from port. The owner,
master, or operator of a tank vessel of 5,000 gross tons or more is required
to calculate the vessel's anticipated under-keel clearance prior to entering
or leaving port. A tank vessel is not allowed to proceed with an anticipated
under-keel clearance of less than 0.5 meters (two feet), or without the
express permission of the Captain of the Port designated by the Coast
Guard. The under-keel clearance requirement would incur a loss in cargo
carrying capacity because vessels are forced to carry less cargo, lighter
before entering port, or offload cargo prior to departing (see Table 1).' 7

12. DOuBLE-HULL TANKER LEGISLATION: AN ASSESSMENT, supra note 10, at 23.
13. Emergency Lightering Equipment and Advanced Notice of Arrival Requirements for
Existing Tank Vessels Without Double Hulls, 59 Fed. Reg. 40,186 (Aug. 5,1994) (codified at 33
C.F.R. §§ 157, 160 (2007)).
14. See id. at 40,188.
15. See Operational Measures to Reduce Oil Spills from Existing Tank Vessels Without
Double Hulls, 61 Fed. Reg. 39,770 (July 30, 1996). The provision regarding the under-keel
clearance requirement was suspended and revised. The final rule revising the provision was
effective January 21,1998. See Operational Measures to Reduce Oil Spills from Existing Tank
Vessels Without Double Hulls, 61 Fed. Reg. 64,618 (Dec. 6, 1996) (codified at 33 C.F.R. § 157
(2007), 46 C.F.R. §§ 31, 35 (2006)) (notice of partial suspension of regulation); Operational
Measures to Reduce Oil Spills from Existing Tank Vessels Without Double Hulls, 62 Fed. Reg.
49,603 (Sept. 23, 1997) (codified at 33 C.F.R. § 157 (2007)).
16. See Structural Measures to Reduce Oil Spills from Existing Tank Vessels Without
Double Hulls, 62 Fed. Reg. 1622 (Jan. 10, 1997) (codified at 33 C.F.R. § 157 (2007)).
17. Operational Measures to Reduce Oil Spills from Existing Tank Vessels Without
Double Hulls, 60 Fed. Reg. 55,904,55,918,55,923-24,55,930 (Nov. 3,1995) (codified at 33 C.F.R.
§ 157 (2007), 46 C.F.R. §§ 31, 35 (2006)); Operational Measures to Reduce Oil Spills from
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The final phase was to require structural measures. Issued on
January 10, 1997, the final rule does not, however, require structural
measures because the Coast Guard determined that these interim structural
measures are not feasible for existing tank vessels without double hulls. The
Coast Guard determined that, while protectively located void spaces
(PL/Spaces) 8 are technologically feasible, they are economically infeasible
for pre-MARPOL tank vessels. The Coast Guard also determined that
hydrostatically balanced loading 19 is technically feasible for single-hull tank
vessels but is difficult for vessels carrying heterogeneous cargoes and
engaged in multi-port voyages." In the end, the rule does not require
structural modifications of single-hull vessels before they are phased out.
B. Cost Effectiveness
The double-hull tanker has an inner hull, separated from the outer
by approximately ten feet. Over the past decade, "collisions and groundings
have been responsible for approximately 70 percent of the oil spillage from"
tank vessels.21 In the case of a collision or grounding, double-hull tankers
are four to six times less likely than single-hull tankers to spill oil.'
"Average outflow is three to four times less with a double-hull compared
to a single-hull tank vessel. " ' 3 If the current fleet predominantly comprising
single-hull vessels were all replaced with double-hull vessels, it is projected
that the double-hull requirements would eliminate "four out of every five
oil spills" and realize a "two-thirds reduction.. .in the total volume of oil
spill[s] [attributable] to collisions and groundings."24 Therefore, the

Existing Tank Vessels Without Double Hulls, 61 Fed. Reg. at 39,791; Kevin E. Lunday &
StephenJ. Darmody, Using FinancialMarkets to Protect the Environment: U.S. Coast Guard Leads
Modem Approach, 10 U.S.F. MAR. L.J. 173, 182-85 (1998).
18. A "PL/space includes any tank or void space that is not used for the carriage of cargo,
cargo residue, slops, dirty ballast or fuel oil." Structural Measures to Reduce Oil Spills from
Existing Tank Vessels Without Double Hulls, 60 Fed. Reg. 67,226-28 (Dec. 28,1995) (codified
at33 C.F.R. § 157 (2007)). "Protectively located" refers to the "distribution of these spaces along
the length of the vessel's hull." Id.
19. Hydrostatically balanced loading means limiting the level of oil cargo to ensure that
the hydrostatic pressure exerted outward by the oil at the tank (and ship) bottom is lower than
the external pressure exerted inward by the seawater. If the tank is breached, seawater will
flow in rather than oil flowing out. Steven L. Crookshank, American Petroleum Institute,
Modifying Single-Hull Tankers: Costs and Benefits (Mar. 1998); DOUBLE-HULL TANKER
LEGISLATION: AN ASSESSMENT, supranote 10, at 266.
20. See Structural Measures to Reduce Oil Spills from Existing Tank Vessels Without
Double Hulls, 62 Fed. Reg. at 1622-23, 1626, 1636.
21. DouBLE-HLL TANKER LEGISLATION: AN ASSESSMENT, supra note 10, at 24.
22. Id. at 139.
23. Id.
24. Id. at 24.
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requirements would have a positive effect on reducing the risk and the
severity of oil spills.'
However, critics claim that double-hull requirements were
introduced due to political pressure from the public and environmental
organizations just after the Exxon Valdez oil spill. These critics contend that
double-hull tankers may not be able to contain oil in the case of high-energy
collisions and are also likely to be more susceptible to fires and explosions
because of accumulation of volatile gases between the two hulls of the tank
vessels. 6 Furthermore, double-hull tank vessels suffer cost disadvantages
in comparison with single-hull tankers: "The increase in cost per
[deadweight ton] for double-hull [tankers] is estimated at between 9 and 17
percent."27 Clear differences in the operating costs between double-hull and
single-hull tankers are found in maintenance and repair (M&R) costs and
hull and machinery (H&M) insurance premiums.2' The M&R "costs for
double-hull tankers [are higher than] those for single-hull tankers by 11 to
37 percent, depending on vessel type."2 9 The costs of marine H&M
insurance per gross ton for a double-hull Very Large Crude Carrier (VLCC)
or Aframax tanker are approximately six percent higher than for a singlehull counterpart, a result of the higher purchase cost of a double-hull
tanker.
3
Furthermore, discounts granted in protection and indemnity (P&I) 0
premiums for "double-hull tankers [from] 1992 to 1995 were terminated in
February 1996 .... Increases in total insurance costs for [double-hull tankers
are] 1 percent for VLCCs, 3 percent for Suezmax tankers, and 4 percent for
Aframax tankers." 31 Total insurance premiums for a double-hull tanker are
higher than for a single-hull tanker of the same size because any reduction
in the P&I premiums are offset by higher H&M premiums.32 The increase
in total operating costs attributable to double-hull tankers is estimated at 5
to 13 percent.

25. Id. at 24, 139.
26. See Richard L. Jarashow, Survey of State Legislation, 5 U.S.F. MAR. L.J. 447, 450 (1993).
27. DOUBLE-HULL TANKER LEGISLATION: AN ASSESSMENT, supra note 10, at 88.
28. See id.
29. Id. at 89.
30. P&I Clubs are associations of shipowners, charterers, ship operators, and managers
who have agreed to insure each other's ships on a mutual and non-profit basis. See SIMON
POLAND & TONY ROOTH, GARD HANDBOOK ON P&I INSURANCE 104-07 (1996); see also STEVEN J.
HAZELWOOD, P&I CLUBS LAW AND PRACTICE 282-83 (2d ed. 1994). As a condition of coverage,
a member must settle the liability claim against him before indemnification from his P&I Club.
See POLAND & RooTH, supra;HAZELWOOD, supra.
31. DOUBLE-HULL TANKER LEGISLATION: AN ASSESSMENT, supra note 10, at 90.
32. See PETROLEUM INDUS. RESEARCH FOUND., INC., TRANSPORTING U.S. OIL IMPORTS: THE
IMPACT OF OIL SPILL LEGISLATION ON THE TANKER MARKET (prepared for the U.S. Department
of Energy) 92-93 (1992) [hereinafter PETROLEUM INDUS.].
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The increase in oil prices due to double-hull requirements
compared with the increase in oil price through insurance cost due to
intensified liability may implicate the relative cost-inefficiency of doublehull requirements in controlling oil pollution risks.33 In fact, one study done
by the U.S. Coast Guard shows that double-hull requirements resulted in
significant costs but moderate benefits. 3
III. THE EFFECTS OF THE DOUBLE-HULL REQUIREMENT
A. Factors Failing to Generate Proper Incentives in the Oil Supply Chain
Under OPA 90
The tank vessel industry serves the oil industry as a link in the oil
supply chain. Tank vessels are employed exclusively for oil transportation
-an industry that is prone to competition. In comparison, the oil cargo
sector is relatively limited in number. Major oil companies still dominate
the oil supply chain, particularly in U.S. waters, even though their influence
has declined. Therefore, the oil industry could exercise control over the
tanker industry by its economic leverage. This implies that the oil cargo
sector could indirectly exercise control over oil pollution risks -and is an
operative decision maker with respect to risks, along with the shipping
sector. If the oil cargo sector made selective use of sound oil tankers, this
would make oil tankers carefully transport oil to survive in the competitive
shipping market. Still, the oil cargo sector would need incentive to do so.
OPA 90 channels liability to the shipping sector without oil cargo
liability. Oil companies currently bear little financial liability for oil
pollution if they are not involved in the ownership of tank vessels. This fails
to generate incentives in the oil cargo sector. In turn, disincentives in the oil
cargo sector undermine incentives in the shipping sector because of the
relationship between the two sectors in the supply chain.
B. The Effect on the Oil Cargo Sector
By channeling substantially unlimited liability to the shipping
sector without holding the oil cargo sector liable, OPA 90 limits the oil
companies' exposure to and liability for oil pollution risks. This has brought

33. Double-hull requirements are estimated to cost $6,408,692,040 (compliance and
enforcement costs [$6,413,027,637]-avoided costs [$4,335,597]) from 1996 through 2025.
Financial responsibility rules cut down total costs by $161,298,722 (compliance and
enforcement costs [$451,440,918]- avoided costs [$612,739,640]) during the same period. See
U.S. COAST GUARD, OPA 90 PROGRAMMATIC REGULATORY ASSESSMENT (PRA) 9-6 (2001) (on file
with Natural Resources Journal).
34. Id. at 8-7.

NATURAL RESOURCES JOURNAL

[Vol. 47

about the retreat of oil companies from the tanker business and thus
undermined incentives for oil companies to replace the aging tanker fleets
with new and safer ships, opting for charters instead. Secondly, this has also
undermined incentives to charter safer, but more expensive, tankers from
responsible shipping companies that have good safety records.35
1. Tank Vessel Ownership by the Oil Industry
a. Evasion of Ownership in General
OPA 90 holds shipowners, operators, or bareboat charterers' liable
as responsible parties -not oil cargo owners.37 The oil cargo owner who
charters the ship on a time or voyage basis does not become an operator
because the time or voyage charterer does not have technical control of the
ship and thus is not liable under OPA 90.3 If oil companies chose to dispose
of all their tank vessels and time or voyage charter in tonnage, they would
not be at risk under OPA 90 9
The majority of companies withdrew or reduced their fleets in U.S.
waters after OPA 90.' Oil company-owned vessel tonnage trading to the
United States dropped from "74.3 million deadweight tons [DWT] in 1990
to 66.4 million deadweight tons in 1994." 4" The policies of some oil
companies exemplified the mainstream of industry responses to enhanced
environmental regulation under OPA 90. On June 11, 1990, Shell announced

35. See Certificates of FinancialResponsibility Under the Oil Pollution Act: Hearing Before the
Subcomm. on Coast Guard and Navigation of the House Comm. on Merchant Marine and Fisheries,
102nd Cong. 149 (1991) (statement of the International Association of Independent Tanker
Owners); 135 CONG. REc. H 8,158 (daily ed. Nov. 8,1989) (statement of Rep. Hammerschmidt);
Oil Pollution Liability and Compensation Act: Hearing and Markup on Title III of H.R. 1465 Before
the Subcomm. on Human Rights and InternationalOrganizations of the House Comm. on Foreign
Affairs, 101st Cong. 86 (1989) (statement of the International Association of Independent Tanker
Owners); ROBERT V. PERCIVAL Er AL., ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION LAW, SCIENCE, AND POLICY
143 (2d ed. 1996); DREWRY SHIPPING CONSULTANTS, THE INTERNATIONAL OIL TANKER MARKET:
SUPPLY, DEMAND AND PROFITABILITY TO 2000, at 80 (1994).
36. There are three types of charter. Under demise (or bareboat) charter, the vessel is let
bare, i.e., without officers and crew. The possession of the vessel is transferred to the charterer.
The common denominator of the other two forms is the non-transfer of possession of the vessel
to the charterer and no operational control of the charterer over the vessel. Under time (or
period) charter, the owner provides the vessel, officers, and crew to the charterer for his
discretionary use for a specified period of time. Under voyage (or spot) charter, the vessel
transports a specific cargo on a single voyage between nominated loading and discharge ports.
See POLAND & ROOTH, supra note 30, at 90-91; DREWRY SHIPPING CONSULTANTS, THE TANKER
CHARTER MARKET-STRUCTURE, PARTICIPANTS AND TRENDS 1(1992).

37.
38.
39.
40.
41.

See 33 U.S.C. § 2701(32) (1999).
See 33 C.F.R. § 380.30 (1996).
See PETROLEUM INDuS., supra note 32, at 65.
See DOUBLE-HULL TANKER LEGISLATION: AN ASSESSMENT, supra note 10, at 83.
Id. at 61.
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that it would use only chartered vessels for the transportation of its oil to
the United States except the Louisiana Offshore Oil Port (LOOP),42 where
its own tankers continued to call, due to the risks of unlimited liability
under OPA 90.43 In addition, British Petroleum, Petrofina, and Texaco
balked at sending their vessels to U.S. waters." Other oil companies such
as Exxon, Fina, Coastal, and Phillips completely disposed of their U.S.
trading fleets, chartering vessels for their oil transportation.' The policy of
oil companies to retreat from tanker ownership between 1990 and 1994 is
closely related to the increased liability limits and the potential for
unlimited liability with vessel ownership under both OPA 90 and American
state laws.46
b. The Baseline Demand for Tank Vessels
It takes approximately 37 days for a tanker to arrive in the Gulf of
Mexico from the Persian Gulf.47 Spot charters are fixed approximately ten
weeks in advance of arrival in the United States, and time charters
approximately four months.' Therefore, oil companies may have the
baseline demand for their own tank vessels to meet immediate
requirements for unscheduled transportation required by the production
and marketing divisions. Oil companies may also need to retain a minimum
of tank vessels to cope with a possible sudden surge in tanker demand in

42. See Wire Reports, France's Elf Follows Shell's Lead in Curbing Tanker Calls in US, J.
COMMERCE, June 25, 1990, at 8B; Antonio J. Rodriguez & Paul A.C. Jaffe, The Oil Pollution Act
of 1990, 15 TUL. MAR. L.J. 1, 25 (1990); LOOP, located approximately 18 miles off the coast of
Louisiana, transfers oil to storage facilities in Louisiana through a pipeline. LOOP Program,
Louisiana Dept. of Transportation & Dev., http://www.dotd.louisiana.gov/programs
grants/loop/ (last visited Oct. 8, 2007).
43. Wire Reports, supra note 42, at 8B; Rodriguez & Jaffe, supra note 42, at 25; Janet Porter,
Boycott of US Ports May Boost Lightering; Operators See Opportunity,J.COMMERCE, July 2, 1990,
at 8B; OIL & GAS J., July 2, 1990, at 2.
44. See Robin Buckner Price, U.S. Oil Spill Law to Cause Growing Tanker Problem,OIL& GAS
J., Sept. 30, 1991, at 21; Solons Reject Tanker Accord; Boycott Grows, OIL & GAS J., July 9, 1990, at
30; Edwin Unsworth, More Tanker Owners Are Forecast to Follow Shell's US Port Pullout, J.
COMMERCE, June 14,1990, at 8B; Rodriguez & Jaffe, supra note 42, at 25-27; Paul S. Edelman,
The Oil Pollution Act of 1990, 8 PACE ENVTL. REV. 1, 22 (1990).
45. DoUBLE-HULL TANKER LEGISLATION: AN ASSESSMENT, supranote 10, at 61.
46. PERCIVAL ETAL., supranote 35, at 130-44; Tanker OwnershipReflects FearofPenalties, OIL
& GAs J., Jan. 15, 1996, at 23; DREWRY SHIPPING CONSULTANTS, supra note 35, at 69, 76-77.
47. Vessel Certificatesof FinancialResponsibility:HearingBefore the Subcomm. on Coast Guard
and Navigation of the House Comm. on Merchant Marine and Fisheries, 103rd Cong. 266 (1994)
(Letter of November 2,1994, to President William J. Clinton from Hon. W.J. Tauzin, Hon. Jack
Fields, Hon. Solomon P. Ortiz, Hon. Howard Coble, Hon. Greg Laughlin, and Hon. Herbert
H. Bateman).
48. Id. at 235 (statement of Jerry A. Aspland, President, Arco Marine, Inc. and Chairman,
API General Comm. on Marine Transportation).
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the charter market.4 9 The major oil companies have largely chosen to delay
replacement of their old single-hull vessels for the baseline demand as long
as it is economically feasible and allowed by OPA 90 and MARPOL 13G. s°
This reluctance to replace old vessels with double-hull vessels increases the
potential oil pollution risks in U.S. waters. At the end of 1992, only five
percent of new ship-buildings were on order from oil companies." Tanker
order books at the end of 1993 showed that Shell ordered only four tankers,
Chevron two tankers, and Conoco two tankers; most orders were placed by
independent owners.5 2 As a result, while more modem fleets tend to be
owned by the independent ship owners, older fleets are owned by the major
oil companies (see Appendix).53 In 2000, the average age of the independent
tankers was approximately 13 years and that of tankers owned by oil
companies was approximately 16 years (see Table 3).' The oil companies
have a choice between operating their own old vessels or chartering vessels.
This would depend on the trade-off between relative costs and their risk
preference, and eventually on their policy or culture.
Table 3: Age of Tankers by Ownership Category, Feb. 2000"
OWNERSHIP
Government
Independent
Oil Company
Total

No.
594
2,791
167
3,552

M DWT
45.2
239.0
19.0
303.2

AvG. AGE
16.0
13.1
16.1
14.5

DWT SHARE

(%)

15
79
6
100

2. Disincentives to CharterSound Vessels
The decline of oil company tanker ownership has led to an increase
in charter activity. The chartered tonnage of the six major oil companies in
the dirty spot market' increased from 116.3 million deadweight cargo tons

49. See LANE C. KENDALL & JAMES J. BUCKLEY, THE BUSINESS OF SHIPPING 379-80 (6th ed.
1994).
50. U.S. Firms Delay Tanker Replacements, OIL & GAS J., Nov. 29, 1993, at 31; Jeffery D.
Morgan, The Oil Pollution Act of 1990: A Look at Its Impact on the Oil Industry, 6 FORDHAM ENVTL.
L.J. 1,18 (1994).
51. Dangerous Waters, ENERGY ECONOMIST, Nov. 27, 1992, at 19.
52. DREwRY SHIPPING CONSULTANTS, supranote 35, at 113-18.
53. Id. at 51.
54. INTL ASS'N OF INDEP. TANKER OWNERS, INTERTANKO FACT SHEET 2000 (Feb. 2000)
(on file with Natural Resources Journal).
55. Id.
56. "Dirty" refers to cargoes of crude oil and certain heavier refined products, notably fuel
oil. DREWRY SHIPPING CONSULTANTS, supra note 36, at 1.
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in 1989 to 160.8 million deadweight cargo tons in 1992. The chartered
tonnage in the clean spot market 7 increased from 6.66 million deadweight
cargo tons in 1989 to 11.11 million deadweight cargo tons in 1992. However,
the chartered tonnage period market decreased from 4.23 million
deadweight tons in 1989 to 2.23 million deadweight tons in 1992. The visible
activities of the major oil companies in the dirty spot market reflect the basic
pattern of U.S. oil imports; crude oil accounts for the majority of U.S. oil
imports. In addition, major oil companies dominate crude oil imports (see
Figure 1)."

Figure 1: Changes in Charter Activity by Major Oil Companies, 1989 and
1992 (million dwct/dwt) 9

01989
:01992

Diry spot

Clean spot

Perod

Major oil companies include British Petroleum, Chevron, Exxon,
Mobil, Royal Dutch Shell and Texaco.
Dirty spot, clean spot: million dwct; period: million dwt.

57. "Clean" refers to cargoes of certain refined products, including gasolines, naphthas,
kerosenes, and gas oils. Id.
58. DREwRY SHIPPING CONSULTANTS, supra note 35, at 70-76.
59. Id. at 80.
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Major oil companies claimed to promote a safe, modem tanker fleet
and to support a two-tier market where quality tonnage was paid a
premium. Promises were made to back the shipowners in modernizing an
aging tanker fleet. However, major oil companies in practice give their
priority to exploration, production, refining, and marketing. Transportation,
the necessary evil to oil production and refining, is simply left to the
independent tanker owners.' The policy of oil companies to charter
tonnage obviously conflicts with their announced environmental
commitments. 61 Basically, this policy is driven by price, not risk of liability
exposure in procuring chartered tonnage, because they are immune from
liability.62 Many oil companies are opting for the cheaper and older vessels
on a spot basis. They refuse to pay for quality tonnage, demonstrating a lack
of interest in period chartering. In addition to retreating from tanker
ownership to evade liability, they fail to compensate for independent tanker
owners' assumption of liability by not offering premiums for quality
tonnage. The cheap "rust bucket" tanker is favored and sets the freight rate
in the spot market. No rate differentiation is made between tankers on the
basis of quality. With insignificant period chartering, the chartering policy
in the spot market prevails.63 Even the period market does not offer rewards
for double hulls, generally providing rewards for less aged or less
superannuated tonnage. 64 As reviewed in the following section, this policy
of oil company avoidance has generated derivative disincentives in the
shipping sector.
B. The Effect on the Shipping Sector
Faced with the risk of unlimited liability and increased capital and
operating costs under OPA 90, the shipping sector has changed its
operation patterns in U.S. waters rather than withdrawing altogether.' An
increase in both capital and operating costs under OPA 90 has led to an
undesirable situation in controlling oil pollution risks. Newer and safer tank
vessels cannot get higher freight rates to offset the increases in their capital

60. DangerousWaters, supranote 51; Tanker Industry Spokesman Warns of Faults in U.S. Oil
Pollution Law, OIL & GAs J., July 27,1992, at 41 (hereinafter Tanker Industry Spokesman).
61. See Tanker Industry Spokesman, supranote 60.
62. See Certificates of FinancialResponsibility Under the Oil Pollution Act: HearingBefore the
Subcomm. on Coast Guardand Navigationof the H. Comm. on MerchantMarine and Fisheries,102nd
Cong. 159 (1991) (statement of Bjorn Wilhelmsen, Board Member, Senior Shipping Advisor,
I.M. Skaugen of Oslo, Norway).
63. See DangerousWaters, supra note 51; Tanker Industry Spokesman, supranote 60; Patrick
Crow, Owners' View of Tankers, OIL & GAs J., Mar. 8, 1993, at 23; Derek Bamber, Never Up for
Long, 58 PETROLEUM ECONoMisT 15,16 (1991).
64. See PETROLEUM INDUS., supranote 32, at 94.
65. See id. at 66.
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and operating costs because the shipping industry is highly competitive. Oil
companies rarely acknowledge safety features of vessels and instead favor
old and cheap vessels. As a result, the policy of the oil cargo sector
undermines the incentives in the shipping sector.
1. Preferencefor Low FreightRates over Vessel Qualityfor Commercial Survival
OPA 90 incurs increases in both capital and operating costs. Capital
costs are increased due to double-hull construction and financing costs.
Extending the lives of existing vessels incurs a more modest, short-term
increase. Operating costs are increased through implementation of stricter
operational procedures, repair and maintenance programs, more complex
contingency planning, and higher insurance costs.' The leading factor in an
increase in operating costs has been the increases in P&I premiums for
tankers trading to the United States .67 These increased costs would be barely
reflected in freight rates, at least in the short term, because freight rates are
fundamentally decided by supply and demand (and the rate at which ships
are scrapped), even though charterers often assume additional insurance
costs incurred for U.S. trade.' The shipping industry suffers surplus
capacity with many older vessels prepared to offer highly competitive rates.
As a result, new tank vessels have to compete with older vessels with
higher maintenance costs under the same low freight rates without
obtaining premium for their high quality. 69 Furthermore, insurance
underwriters also have been slow to reward quality tonnage with lower
premiums and are not convinced of the reduction of risks by a double-hull
tank vessel to reduce premiums.7" Given the limited financial resources,
shipowners would offset increased insurance costs by reducing the level of
safety activity on operation and maintenance. 7'

66. See id. at 90-91, 93.
67. See id. at 91.
68. See id. at 93, 95; Aviva Freudmann, Oil Tanker Owners Adjust to Risks Under Pollution
Law, J. COMMERCE, Feb. 21, 1991, at 9A; Janet Porter, Operators FearRush to Replace Old Ships,
J. COMMERCE, Aug. 26, 1993, at 6A.
69. See Amoco Trims Charters,PLATI'SOILGRAM NEWS, Feb. 3,1993, at 1; Morgan, supra note
50, at 18.
70. See Patrick Crow, Owners' View of Tankers, OIL & GAs J., Mar. 8, 1993, at 23; Morgan,
supra note 50, at 18; Robin Buckner Price, U.S. Oil Spill Law to Cause Growing Tanker Problem,
OIL & GASJ., Sept. 30, 1991, at 21.
71. See Oil Pollution Liability and Compensation Act: Hearingand Markup on Title III of H.R.
1465 Before the Subcomm. on Human Rights and InternationalOrganizationsof the H. Comm. on
Foreign Affairs, 101st Cong. 33 (1989) (Temple, Barker & Sloane, Inc., Analysis of Alternative
Approaches to Tanker Oil Spill Liability and Compensation); The Federal Requirements for
Vessels to Obtain Evidence of Financial Responsibilityfor Oil Spill Liability Under the Oil Pollution
Act of 1990: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Coast Guard and Maritime Transportationof the H.
Comm. on Transportation and Infrastructure, 104th Cong. 13 (1996) (statement of Winthrop
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The preference of charterers for low freight rates over quality of
tank vessels would, in turn, undermine an incentive for shipowners to take
risk reduction steps, discouraging quality tonnage. 72 Oil companies' disincentives to charter sound vessels have produced derivative disincentives of
shipping companies to maintain sound tonnage. There is little incentive for
tanker owners to replace or modernize their fleets. 3 The potential of
unlimited liability under OPA 90 is discouraging the formation of capital
needed to acquire new tonnage. The depressed freight rates have failed to
differentiate vessels in terms of quality by formulating a two-tier freight
market. This development is also discouraging investment in new tonnage
and delaying the replacement, of old tonnage. In addition, financial
institutions facilitate this situation by emphasizing the cash flow from
operations instead of vessel asset values in their loan business.7' The
shipping companies have taken advantage of cost-efficient older single-hull
tank vessels. This could have significant implications on the control of oil
pollution risks as well as shipping logistics and oil distribution costs, while
the availability of imported crude is barely affected.'
2. The ParadoxicalEffect of Double-Hull Requirements
The retirement deadlines of single-hull vessels under OPA 90 have
had the paradoxical effect of encouraging tanker owners to operate their
vessels up to the end of their legal economic lives because the deadlines
reduce the resale value of vessels nearing their end.76 In particular, OPA 90
exempts single-hull vessels operating in designated lightering zones or
deepwater offshore oil ports, such as LOOP, until 2015.7 Large tankers are
employed for long-haul oil transportation to take advantage of the benefits
of the lower unit cost of transportation. However, large tankers cannot be
accommodated to discharge their cargo in U.S. ports because of insufficient

Wyman, Vice Chairman, OMI Petrolink Corporation); PETROLEUM INDUS., supranote 32, at 77.
72. See Oil Pollution Liability and Compensation Act: Hearingand Markup on Title III of H.R.
1465 Before the Subcomm. on Human Rights and International Organizationsof the H. Comm. on
Foreign Affairs, 101st Cong. 16 (1989) (statement of Jaffrey N. Shane, Assistant Secretary for
Policy and International Affairs); Certificatesof FinancialResponsibilityunderthe Oil PollutionAct:
HearingBefore the Subcomm. on Coast Guardand Navigationof the H. Comm. on Merchant Marine
and Fisheries, 102d Cong. 159 (1991) (statement of Bjorn Wilhelmsen, Board Member, Senior
Shipping Advisor, I.M. Skaugen of Oslo, Norway).
73. See Rodriguez & Jaffe, supra note 42, at 26-27.
74. See Joseph Bonney, Money for Ships? "Yes, but..." FinancialSources of Shipping Lines,
AM. SHIPPER, May 1993, at 36; Amoco Trims Charters,supranote 69; Morgan, supranote 50, at 18.
75. See PETROLEUM INDUS., supranote 32, at 90.
76. See Freudmann, supra note 68.
77. See 46 U.S.C. § 3703a(b) (1999).

Fall 20071

"MILKING" OIL TANKERS

water depth.78 This exemption from the double-hull requirement would
postpone the retirement of large single-hull tankers of 150,000 deadweight
tons or above, for which unloading long-haul source oil in the lightering
zones or at the deepwater port is economical. Furthermore, oil tankers
calling at LOOP receive discounts on the surcharge of the P&I Clubs and
premiums of $200 million additional coverage because LOOP is located in
a low risk area, meaning not a susceptible shoreline or an area of
commercial development.7 9 However, Aframax or Suezmax tankers
(between 80,000 and 150,000 deadweight tons) are proper for the short- and
medium-haul trade from South America and the Caribbean because they
are able to deliver their oil cargo directly to the ports, unlike the larger
80
tankers employed for long-haul imports from the Middle East and Africa.
Because unloading offshore is not economical for them, smaller single-hull
tankers that sail directly into ports without lightering or with partial
lightering are expected to be scrapped in accordance with the economically
determined scrapping age or to be phased out by 2010, in accordance with
the retirement schedule of single-hull tankers under OPA 90.81 In the near
future, the market for smaller tankers will be tightened because of the
scrapping of the old tankers built in the 1970s, facilitated by OPA 90 and
MARPOL 13G. A surplus is expected for larger tankers, particularly Very
Large Crude Carriers (VLCCs).82 In turn, this economic impetus is caused
by the increase in long-haul crude oil imports.'
In comparison with double-hull tankers, older single-hull tankers
can continue to operate profitably, even with lower charter rates, because
of their sufficiently lower capital and operating costs.' In addition, there are
no longer discounts in P&I premiums for double-hull tankers. Discounts in
P&I premiums are conferred on all vessels with segregated ballast tanks
(SBTs). As a result, "there are currently no significant [disparities] in P&I
insurance costs between double-hull and single-hull tankers."" The

78. See PETROLEUM INDUS., supranote 32, at 61; KENDALL &BUCKLEY, supra note 38, at 386;
DOUBLE-HULL TANKER LEGISLATION: AN ASSESSMENT, supra note 10, at 14, 46; ENERGY INFO.
ADMIN., supra note 1, at 38.
79. See U.S. COAST GUARD, REGULATORY IMPACT ANALYSIS: FINANCIAL RESPONSIBILITY FOR
WATER POLLUTION (VESSELS) 78 (1994); Robin Buckner Price, U.S. Oil Spill Law to Cause Growing
Tanker Problem, OIL & GAS J., Sept. 30, 1991, at 21, 26.
80. See DOUBLE-HULL TANKER LEGISLATION: AN ASSESSMENT, supra note 10, at 43-45, 63;
Steven Anastasion et al., Commentary: Oil Pollution Act of 1990: Offshore Oil Spills, the Tanker
Business and the Regulationof Pollution Control, 27 MARINE TECH. SOC'YJ. 68,74 (1993).
81. See DOUBLE-HULL TANKER LEGISLATION: AN ASSESSMENT, supra note 10, at 49-51, 63,
148.
82. Id. at 76.
83. See id. at 63.
84. See Dangerous Waters, supra note 51; Bamber, supra note 63.
85. DOUBLE-HULL TANKER LEGISLATION: AN ASSESSMENT, supra note 10, at 90.
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operation of single-hull tank vessels has resulted in economic penalties to
companies operating double-hull tank vessels."6 Chronic inadequate freight
rates to provide the financial resources needed for the construction of
double-hull tankers, the absence of significant discriminative rate premiums
for double-hull tankers, and the dominance of spot chartering over period
chartering have all contributed to the stagnation in orders for new tankers
by independent owners. This implies that the tanker market is profitable for
the operation of older single-hull tankers but not strong enough to
compensate for the costs of new double-hull tankers.8 7 In particular,
shipping companies that continue to operate have difficulty competing with
oil companies and shipping companies that "milk" their old single-hull
vessels to eventually dispose of their shipping operations.
Shipowners are likely to be tempted to continue to operate their
single-hull VLCCs built before 1994 and to reap the benefit of relatively low
costs by taking maximum advantage of the OPA 90 exemption.8 If they can
be operated economically, some single-hull VLCCs are expected to continue
to trade to the United States until 2015, according to the retirement schedule
under MARPOL 13G. The recovery of freight rates would extend the larger
tanker's life with protectively located segregated ballast tanks (PL/SBT),"9
protectively located double-sides (PL/DS), protectively located doublebottoms (PL/DB), or hydrostatically balanced loading (HBL). 90 This life
extension incurs an increase in operating costs for older tankers because of
special surveys required. The use of HBL will reduce cargo capacity and
revenues. However, the advantages of low capital and operating costs can
offset these economic disadvantages.91 In addition, reduced cargo capacity
would increase tank vessel traffic and thus increase oil pollution risks. 92

86. See Structural Measures to Reduce Oil Spills from Existing Tank Vessels Without
Double Hulls, 62 Fed. Reg. 1622, 1625 (Jan. 10, 1997) (to be codified at 33 C.F.R. § 157).
87. DOUBLE-HULL TANKER LEGISLATION: AN ASSESSMENT, supra note 10, at 83-84, 95.
88. See PETROLEUM INDUS., supra note 32, at 87.
89. "'Segregated ballast' means the ballast water introduced into a tank which is
completely separated from the cargo oil and oil fuel system and which is permanently
allocated to the carriage of ballast or to the carriage of ballast or cargoes other than oil or
noxious substances..... Regulations for the Prevention of Pollution by Oil, MARPOL 1(17) (on
file with Natural Resources Journal). A protectively located segregated ballast tank means that
SBT provides "a measure of protection against oil outflow in the event of grounding or
collision." Modifications and Additions to the international Convention for the Prevention of
Pollution from Ships, MARPOL 13E (on file with Natural Resources Journal).
90. See DOUBLE-HULL TANKER LEGISLATION: AN ASSESSMENT, supra note 10, at 48-51, 63,
94.
91. See id. at 148.
92. Structural Measures to Reduce Oil Spills from Existing Tank Vessels Without Double
Hulls, 62 Fed. Reg. 1622, 1625 (1997).
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IV. CONCLUSION
The adverse selection of tankers will become serious in U.S. waters
as the international VLCC fleet ages and other nations, such as Japan and
Korea, introduce age restrictions on vessels calling on their ports. This trend
is ultimately attributable to charterers taking advantage of the low rates
instead of avoiding old single-hull tankers. The three sectors -shipping,
P&I insurance, and oil cargo - generate synergetic effects toward this
undesirable direction. This dilution of incentives is barely handled by
stringent liability on the shipping sector. The oil cargo sector is the service
consumer of the shipping sector. Tankers are exclusively designed for oil
transportation. Oil companies are relatively limited in number, while
shipping companies are prone to competition. These factors make it
possible for oil companies to exercise control over the shipping sector by
selective chartering. It is necessary to generate incentives for the oil cargo
sector to charter selectively and thus to induce the shipping sector to take
safety steps. As they continue to operate years into the future, single-hull
tank vessels will pose significant oil spill risks because of structural
deficiencies such as thin plating and unsatisfactory maintenance and
repairs.93 It is necessary to take appropriate measures to ensure the
adequate maintenance and operation of the older VLCCs operating under
the exemption of OPA 90.'

93. See Chris Chivers, Troubled Waters: Despite a Wake up Call Named Exxon Valdez, Oil
Tankers Continue to Foul the World's Waterways E: THE ENVTL. MAG., May/June 1996, available
at http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mim1594/is-n3_v7/ai-18378773 (last visited Nov. 4,
2007).
94. See DOUBLE-HULL TANKER LEGISLATION: AN ASSESSMENT, supra note 10, at 147.
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APPENDIX
Phaseout Schedule for Vessels Without Double Hulls by Size and Age 95
SIZE OF VESSEL

(GT)
year of doublehull compliance

1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012

single
hull

40
39
38
37
36
35
35
35
35
35
25
25
25
25
25
25

double
sides or
double
bottom
45
44
43
42
41
40
40
40
40
40
30
30
30
30
30
30
30
30

2013

30

2014
2015

30
30

95.

Id. at 22.

15,000-29,999

5,000-14,999

single
hull

40
38
36
34
32
30
29
28
27
26
25
25
25
25
25
25

1

double
sides or
double
bottom
45
43
41
39
37
35
34
33
32
31
30
30
30
30
30
30
30
30
30
30
30

> 30,000

single
hull

28
27
26
25
24
23
23
23
23
23
23
23
23
23
23
23

double
sides or
double
bottom
33
32
31
30
29
28
28
28
28
28
28
28
28
28
28
28
28
28
28
28
28

